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Abstract: Given any proposition, is it possible to have rationally acceptable 
attitudes towards it? Absent reasons to the contrary, one would probably 
think that this should be possible. In this paper I provide a reason to the 
contrary. There is a proposition such that, if one has any opinions about it at 
all, one will have a rationally unacceptable set of propositional attitudes – 
or if one doesn’t, one will end up being cognitively imperfect in some other 
manner. 
The proposition I am concerned with is a self-referential propositional 
attitude ascription involving the propositional attitude of rejection. Given a 
basic assumption about what constitutes irrationality, and a few 
assumptions about the nature of cognitively ideal agents, a paradox results. 
This paradox is superficially like the Liar, but it is importantly different in 
that no alethic notions are involved at all. As such, it stands independent of 
the Liar and is not a ‘revenge’ version of it. 
After setting out the paradox I discuss possible responses. After 
considering several I argue that one is best off simply accepting that the 
paradox shows us something surprising and interesting about rationality: 
that some cognitive shortfall is unavoidable even for ideal agents. I argue 
that nothing disastrous follows from accepting this conclusion.  
Keywords: Rejection, Bilateralism, Propositional Attitudes, Paradox, 
Rationality, Dialetheism, Indeterminacy. 
 
1. Rejection 
 
In recent years there has been some enthusiasm among philosophers of logic for taking 
1 I would like to thank Michael Bench-Capon, Jason Turner, Robbie Williams and Francesco Berto and 
several anonymous referees for comments on drafts of this material, and audiences at Leeds, 
Manchester, Amsterdam and Aberdeen. This paper was prepared within the 2013-15 AHRC project 
The Metaphysical basis of Logic: the Law of Non-Contradiction as Basic Knowledge (grant ref. 
AH/K001698/1).  
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as primitive not only a propositional attitude of acceptance (and a speech act of 
assertion that expresses it) but also a propositional attitude of rejection (and a speech 
act of denial that expresses it). If assertion is akin to saying ‘yes’ to a question, denial is 
akin to saying ‘no’: they are equally strong but opposed ways of taking an opinion on 
something. As such both are distinct from and incompatible with the suspension of 
judgement. Taking denial/rejection as primitive – a view known as ‘bilateralism’ – is a 
departure from the Fregean orthodoxy which identifies denying something with 
asserting its negation. But many have though that this ideological enrichment earns its 
keep.1F2 Here are some of the uses it has been put to: 
• To explain the normative import of logical consequence. It has been proposed 
that if A1, A2, …, An ├ B holds then one should not accept all of A1, A2, …, An  
without also accepting B. But this seems too demanding, because the things 
one accepts will generally entail multitudes. To make the requirement more 
reasonable, one option is to restrict it to known entailment (Field 2009). But 
alternatively one could say that if A1, A2, …, An ├ B holds, one should not accept 
all of A1, A2, …, An while rejecting B (Restall 2005). 
• To account for the significance and meaning of negation. It’s been proposed, for 
instance, that negation amounts to something like an embeddable rejection 
sign (Bendall 1979, Price 1990). 
• To account for the possibility of disagreement in a way consonant with 
dialetheism: the view that there are true contradictions. On such a view, 
accepting a proposition and its negation is sometimes the rational thing to do, 
and so disagreement can't in general be conceived as one person accepting a 
proposition and another accepting its negation. After all, if the proposition in 
question is a truth of the form A & ¬A, both persons may accept A and accept 
¬A and not be in disagreement. Instead, the dialetheist conceives of 
disagreement as one person accepting a proposition and another rejecting it – 
attitudes which are always incompatible (Priest 2005). 
• To characterise in neutral terms the differences between different (classical, 
intuitionist, paraconsistent) logics of negation (Restall 2005 & 2013). 
• To solve the so-called ‘categoricity problem’ for propositional logic (Smiley 
1996, Rumfitt 2000). 
Which general principles one takes to constrain the attitudes of acceptance and denial 
2 Frege (1919). For a general introduction to the notion and a vindication of it pace Frege, see Smiley 
(1996). 
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will depend to some extent on the logical principles one endorses. Intuitionists and 
paracompletists may hold that sometimes one should reject a proposition and reject its 
negation, though this is a matter of disagreement (cf. Wright 2001 and Caie 2012). 
Dialetheists generally hold that in some cases one should accept a proposition and also 
its negation. Classicists might not allow either of those options. Everyone seems to 
agree, however, on the following: 
[PSA] One cannot rationally accept and reject the same proposition.  
This principle, which we might call the Principle of Self-Agreement or PSA for short, is 
held to be a basic claim about rationality2F3. But more than that, it is held to be 
constitutive of the notion of rejection, and crucial for the uses that notion is put to. The 
principle, in any case, seems eminently plausible to me3F4. 
The Principle of Self-Agreement should be clearly distinguished from the claim that 
accepting and rejecting the same proposition is impossible, either psychologically or 
metaphysically.4F5 That is a very different claim, and less plausible to my mind. It is 
certainly implausible that anyone would, with full presence of mind, resolve to accept a 
proposition and also to reject that proposition, but it seems perfectly conceivable that 
someone sufficiently confused could be led by one train of thought to accept P and by 
another to reject P, and not notice that they had done so. 
Note also that the plausibility of the principle is independent of whether one is a 
‘bilateralist’, i.e. a primitivist about rejection, or whether one takes the Fregean line of 
identifying it with the acceptance of a negation. For those philosophers taking the 
Fregean view – who will not be dialetheists, for reasons already stated – the Principle 
of Self-Agreement would rule out accepting a proposition and accepting its negation, 
3 Throughout this paper, the notion of rationality I discuss is a synchronic one, that is, a notion of 
rationality that governs a subject’s propositional attitudes as they are at some given moment. This is 
to be contrasted with a diachronic notion of rationality, which governs transitions from one set of 
propositional attitudes to another. So, to illustrate, it is a requirement of synchronic rationality that 
one’s beliefs be consistent (let’s say) but it is a requirement of diachronic rationality that when one’s 
beliefs are inconsistent, one give up those inconsistency-generating beliefs that are least justified 
(let’s say). There is a debate to be had about whether one of these notions of rationality is to be 
cashed out in terms of the other, but that debate doesn’t matter for anything I’ll say in this paper. 
4 Though I would like to be able to provide an argument for the principle, I would not know where to 
look for premises – it seems too basic for such. If one took the notion of rejection to be analysable in 
terms of assertion and negation, as per the Fregean view (above), one could argue for it from claims 
about negation, unless one were a dialetheist. But the dialetheist, as we have seen, already has 
reason to reject the Fregean view. If one takes the notion of rejection as primitive, one has a good 
reason for accepting the principle, for without it, it becomes hard to say what the opposition 
between acceptance and rejection consists in. 
5 This is a view Graham Priest defended at one point, as evinced by his (2006), pp. 98-99. He has since 
backed off from it, though not in print, as far as I know.  
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and it would thus be something like a pragmatic ancillary of the Law of Non-
Contradiction. Not being dialetheists, they will not have a problem with that. The 
emergence of the paradox similarly does not depend on whether one is a primitivist 
about rejection or not. Although interest in the notion of rejection is most commonly 
found among bilateralists, the paradox I present is there for everyone to enjoy. 
To run the paradox we also require three further assumptions. The first one is a 
broadly metaphysical one concerning propositional attitudes: 
[A] Accepting that one bears an attitude of acceptance or rejection to a 
proposition suffices for bearing the attitude in question towards that 
proposition. 
I think this is a plausible assumption, but it is open to some interpretation. On a strong 
reading, accepting that I have a certain attitude constitutes having that attitude (in 
either a metaphysical or conceptual manner) and so suffices for it. On a weaker 
reading, it simply happens to be the case (perhaps as a matter of psychological 
regularity) that whenever I accept that I have some attitude X, I have that attitude. We 
need nothing more than the weak reading for the paradox. It need not even hold 
without exception, as long as we can presume it to hold in any given case, absent 
evidence to the contrary.5F6 
Then, finally, we need two assumptions concerning ideal cognitive agents: 
[B] For any attitude one bears to a proposition, one accepts that one bears 
this attitude to it. 
[C] For any attitude one does not bear to a proposition, one rejects that 
one bears this attitude to it. 
These assumptions are fairly demanding. It is plausible that few if any actual agents will 
satisfy them in full generality. Nevertheless, they are not so strong that we cannot 
expect actual agents to satisfy them for a good many propositions. Assumption B will 
presumably fail in cases where subjects simply haven’t reflected on their own attitudes. 
These cases will presumably be numerous in actual agents, but an ideal agent will (I 
submit) display a full awareness of their own attitudes. Assumption C will most 
obviously fail in cases where an agent hasn’t given any thought to some proposition at 
all, let alone taken an attitude towards it. Such cases will again be numerous in actual 
6  Exceptions might be cases in which one is under- or misinformed about the contents of a proposition 
which one endorses or denies. Maybe in such cases one can accept that one accepts something while 
failing to actually accept it. But the case is not clear. One might hold, for instance, that if a lack of 
comprehension of P stops one from having attitudes of acceptance or rejection to it, that same lack 
of comprehension would stop one from having second-order propositional attitudes involving P. 
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agents, but an ideal agent can be expected to have considered what attitudes to take 
(or not take) on any given topic. 
There is, of course, ample room for disagreeing about what an ideal cognitive agent 
looks like. I do not mean to legislate. I think there is probably a range of notions of 
ideality, suitable for a range of different theoretical purposes. But I do think that there 
is a recognisable notion of cognitive ideality out there which involves satisfying 
assumptions like B and C, and indeed A. One might call an agent that is ideal in that 
way a transparent agent: they are fully and accurately opinionated about their own 
attitudes on any given matter, both about the ground-level ones and about the higher-
order ones (i.e. those that pertain to their own attitudes). It is my concern in this paper 
to say something about the limits of agents of that sort. 
All that being said, it is worth noting that if we were to take a non-ideal but 
reasonably clear-headed agent, expose them to some particular proposition P and the 
evidence concerning P, and ask them to try and make up their mind about it, then we 
may reasonably expect them to end up satisfying A, B and C with regard to P. I think 
this will also hold for the paradoxical proposition to be discussed shortly, and as a 
result the paradox also has some bearing on the nature of non-ideal agents. But the 
case is clearer with ideal agents, so that is what I will focus on. 
In the next section I examine a self-referential proposition which is such that one 
cannot fail to have irrational attitudes towards it – irrational in the sense of violating 
the Principle of Self-Agreement – if one satisfies assumptions A, B and C. It is broadly 
analogous to a Liar sentence, but truth and falsity play no role in generating this puzzle, 
and in addition the most obvious analogues of gappy or glutty approaches do not stop 
the paradox. 
After setting out the paradox, I will discuss a number of responses to it, some more 
promising than others. I will ultimately suggest that we are best off accepting that 
there are cases of unavoidable irrationality. In the final section I’ll investigate what the 
upshot of that would be. I argue that nothing unacceptable follows from it: we have 
simply learned something new and surprising about ideal cognitive agents. 
 
2. Paradox 
 
Consider the following self-referential proposition, which I’ll call “R”, as short for 
5 
“Rejecter” 6F7: 
[R] I reject R. 
What stance can one rationally take towards R, if any? There are prima facie four 
options: (i) accept it, (ii) reject it, (iii) do neither or (iv) do both. Options (iii) and (iv) 
seem to be the closest analogues of, respectively, gappy7F8 and glutty solutions to a Liar 
paradox, though nothing turns on that analogy. Of these four options, we can strike off 
(iv) immediately, since it runs headlong into the Principle of Self-Agreement.  
Let’s take a closer look at the other options. What about (i)? If one accepts the 
proposition, then one accepts that one rejects R. Can one rationally do this? As it turns 
out, no. Accepting R entails accepting that one rejects it, for that is the content of R. By 
assumption A, accepting that one rejects R entails that one rejects R. Thus one will 
both accept and reject R, which by PSA one cannot rationally do.  
So much for option (i), then. What about (ii)? If one rejects R, one rejects that one 
rejects R, for that is the content of R. Is that problematic? As it turns out, yes. On 
assumption B, rejecting R entails accepting that one rejects it. So, one ends up both 
accepting and rejecting that one rejects R. And that is equivalent to accepting and 
rejecting R.  
So much then for option (ii). The only option left to consider is (iii): neither rejecting 
nor accepting R. This seems to me to be the most straightforward analogue of a gappy 
response to an alethic paradox. This option initially seems promising: after all, not 
accepting R does not entail that one rejects it, so one doesn’t straightforwardly get the 
problems of option (ii). And likewise, not rejecting R does not entail that one accepts it, 
so one doesn’t straightforwardly get the problems of option (i). But problems do 
emerge if we take into account assumption C. 
On assumption C, not accepting R entails rejecting that one accepts R. This does not 
lead to any problem. But on assumption C  not rejecting R also entails rejecting that 
one rejects R. And rejecting that one rejects R is problematic, as we saw in the case of 
option (ii): via assumption B one again ends up accepting and rejecting that one rejects 
7  The form of self-reference that goes on here is a bit less straight-forward than in the case of the Liar 
sentence, though I do not think it in any way problematic. While the Liar says of itself that it is false, 
the Rejecter says of the speaker that the speaker rejects it. Self-reference is still achieved, but it runs 
by way of the speaker’s attitudes. Although less popular now, in the past various recipes for 
combating paradoxes have involved banning self-reference from the language, most famously Tarski’s 
(1933) recipe. Whether the type of anti-paradox legislation that rules out Liar-like self-reference will 
also automatically rule out R is not obvious: it would depend on the fine print. 
8. There are other responses to R that are also reminiscent of gappy solutions. I discuss these in the 
next section. 
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R. 
It seems, then, that one cannot take any one of options (i), (ii), (iii) or (iv) without 
violating the Principle of Self-Agreement. Insofar as that principle is constitutive of 
rationality, an ideal cognitive agent cannot avoid being irrational when it comes to R. 
 
3. Some initial responses 
 
Although R is a bit like the liar paradox, it is not an alethic paradox. 8F9 Since it involves 
propositional attitude ascriptions, we might call it a pragmatic paradox. Paradoxes are 
the kind of thing we usually try to get rid of. Are there any promising ways to rid 
ourselves of the Rejecter? There are certainly some options worth considering. One 
quite promising solution to a very similar paradox is defended in Caie (2012). I think 
Caie’s solution ultimately fails, however, and I will explain why. But before I do that I 
first want to discuss more briefly two other options which, though less promising, are 
still worth touching on. 
Infinite-Order Agnosticism. To avoid the irrationality threatened by the Rejecter an 
agent might try not to have any attitudes towards R, but also no attitudes about one’s 
attitudes toward R, and no attitudes about those, etc. If one were in that position, the 
assumptions A through C could not be deployed to get one into trouble. This option 
9 Terence Parsons discusses a similar sophism in his (1984), formulated using denial rather than 
rejection: 'I deny this very sentence'. He notes one cannot coherently deny it, but doesn’t take the 
matter much further than that. Caie (2012) discusses a close relative of the Rejecter (formulated in 
terms of disbelief) and proposes a response to it. I’ll discuss that response in section 4. 
 The Rejecter is also worth comparing to a paradox discussed by Graham Priest in his (2005), chapter 
6. It involves a proposition p: “it is irrational to believe that p” (he regards it as a variant of the 
‘irrationalist’s paradox’ due to Greg Littman). To believe it would be to believe something which one 
considers irrational, and since that is irrational, one ought not believe it. But if it’s indeed irrational to 
believe it, then that shows that p is true, and that one ought to believe it. One ends up in a situation 
where one ought and ought not believe p. 
 If we reformulate p as ‘one ought to reject p’, a resemblance between Priest’s paradox and the 
Rejecter emerges. The two involve some of the same issues. For instance, its (reformulated) 
derivation arguably involves something like a normative analogue of our assumption A: one ought to 
reject what one accepts one ought to reject. As such, we can see Priest’s discussion as an anticipation 
of the Rejecter. 
However, Priest’s discussion is brief, effectively restricted to a discussion of option (ii), above. It’s not 
clear how Priest’s paradox would fare on the other options: at least prima facie, it seems possible to 
reject p (i.e. take option iii) without landing in irrationality; one could reject something without 
believing that one ought to. Option (iv) also seems prima facie safe. Furthermore, Priest’s bullet-
biting solution to his paradox is to accept that there are dialetheias concerning what’s rational; while 
my proposed response (below) will also be of a bullet-biting nature, it does not involve buying a 
contradiction, and so is far less logically committal. 
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could be seen as another (perhaps more thorough-going) analogue to a gappy 
response to the Liar. It seems psychologically unlikely that we ordinary mortals can put 
oneself in this state through a process of reflection. But nevertheless, it's a state we 
can be in, for it is the state one would be in if one has never considered R. So that 
would be a basic way of avoiding the looming irrationality: avoid the proposition R. But, 
first off, this won’t be an option for anyone who has already had the misfortune of 
encountering R. Second, and more to the point, the kind of ideal cognitive agent we are 
considering, one that satisfies assumption C, cannot evade any proposition entirely: 
even if they have no opinions about some proposition, they will still be aware of their 
lack of opinions about that proposition, and that is enough to get the paradox going. So 
this response does not pan out in the case of the ideal cognitive agents we’re 
interested in. 
Incoherentism. One might resort to denying the Principle of Self-Agreement. If that 
principle is dropped, the problem does indeed go away. But note the cost: we would 
lose pretty much any grip we had on the notion of rejection. It is essential to the notion 
of rejection that it is somehow opposed to acceptance – it's hard to see how one would 
capture this opposition, if not through the principle in question. Furthermore, the 
notion of rejection could no longer play most of the roles it has been called upon to 
play (see section 1). For example, dialetheists would not be able to account for 
disagreement in terms of acceptance and rejection, any more than they can do so in 
terms of acceptance and negation.9F10 And, last but not least, this looks like a fairly ad 
hoc move. 
These, then are the options I consider less promising. More mileage is to be gotten 
out of a response proposed by Michael Caie in his (2012), concerning a paradox very 
similar to the Rejecter. According to that proposal, one ought to have (and ideal agents 
would have) indeterminate attitudes towards R. 
 
4. Indeterminism about the Rejecter. 
 
Perhaps the proper stance toward R is not one of (i) – (iv) but rather another one in 
which it is (v) indeterminate whether or not one accepts R and indeterminate whether 
or not one rejects it, and hence indeterminate whether one does both, and whether 
10 This makes our paradox an interesting challenge for dialetheists. While arguably no-one has it easier 
than them when it comes to alethic paradoxes, the very ideology they need in order to account for 
disagreement generates a paradox that they cannot respond to in their patented manner. 
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one does neither.  The thought would be that since one isn't determinately in any one 
of the problematic states, no irrationality results.  
For this to work, one would also have to reject some instances of the law of excluded 
middle. One should deny that one either accepts or doesn't accept R, and that one 
either rejects or doesn't reject R. If one doesn't, then one can still derive the 
paradoxical conclusion, by arguing by cases from the disjunction of (i) – (iv). So this 
solution looks to be a non-classical and more specifically paracomplete one.10F11 In any 
case, that is the approach that Caie (2012) takes. 
I think the indeterminist approach will not work, and I will try and show that in a bit. 
But let’s just suppose, for the sake of argument, that it does get the job done: if one’s 
attitudes to R are indeterminate, one will not end up violating the Principle of Self-
Agreement. That still leaves some philosophical questions unanswered. As in the case 
of infinite-order agnosticism, it seems unlikely that one can, by deliberating, put 
oneself in a state of attitudinal indeterminacy. A more promising line to take, perhaps, 
is that the natural result of reflecting upon R is confusion about R, and that this 
confusion should be diagnosed as a state of attitudinal indeterminacy of the above 
sort. If that is so, then the surprising lesson of the Rejecter paradox is not that ideal 
cognitive agents are inevitably irrational, but that they are inevitably confused.  
But is it obvious that one ought to diagnose confusion about R that way? In 
particular, is that diagnosis more plausible than saying that to be confused about R is to 
end up, nolens volens, taking stance (iii), i.e. neither accepting nor rejecting R? The 
indeterminate state may have the advantage of staving off irrationality, but that of 
course doesn't mean that it’s the state we in fact naturally end up in. To reason in that 
way would be to reason ad consequentiam. We thus end up with a question of 
philosophical psychology – what exactly does confusion consist in? – one that I have no 
11  There may be some mileage in classical solutions, but they don’t quite seem to get the job done. 
Suppose one were an epistemicist about indeterminacy. Then one might suggest that though there is 
a fact of the matter about which stance one takes to R, we are in principle ignorant of which one it is. 
In that case, the assumptions (b) and (c) seem to fail; possibly also (a). So in that case, if the stance 
one is in fact taking is one of (i) through (iii), irrationality does not ensue. But since one may in fact be 
taking stance (iv), it is not determinately the case (by epistemicist lights) that one is not in an 
irrational state. The best result the epistemicist can secure here is that one also isn’t determinately in 
an irrational state. Supervaluationism about indeterminacy hits the same snag. Of course, one could 
claim that though it is indeterminate whether one is taking stance (i), (ii) or (iii), it is determinate that 
one isn’t taking stance (iv). One way of guaranteeing this is to say that taking stance (iv) is simply 
(psychologically or metaphysically) impossible, as Priest does. But as noted above, it is unclear what 
the motivation would be for saying this. Saying that (iv) would be irrational would be to beg the 
question: we want to know whether or not we are in fact rational when we come to R, and we don’t 
take it as given that we are. 
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idea how to settle properly.11F12 
A proponent of the indeterminacy view might fairly complain at this point, though. 
Given that we are talking about ideal agents, is it really relevant to ask how they 
manage to get themselves into the indeterministic state? We already know that ideal 
agents are unrealistic; we can just assume them to be capable of the required feats of 
mental agility, even if those are unrealistic. That is a fair point. The main issue, 
ultimately, is whether the indeterminist approach gets the job done. But alas it doesn’t: 
although it may handle the straight Rejecter, there is a revenge paradox lurking just 
around the corner. Take the following proposition: 
(R*) I determinately reject R*. 
This proposition – call it the Determined Rejecter – lands us in irrationality in all of the 
ways that R did, and more. Given that determinacy is factive (i.e. if one determinately 
rejects R*, one rejects R*) one could use assumptions A-C to show that one gets into 
the same trouble with R* as with R. However, to make the case clear it may help to 
rejig A-C so that they pertain explicitly to determinate attitudes: 
[A*] Determinately accepting that one determinately bears an attitude of 
acceptance or rejection to a proposition suffices for determinately 
bearing the attitude in question towards that proposition. 
[B*] For any attitude one determinately bears to a proposition, one 
determinately accepts that one determinately bears this attitude to it. 
[C*] For any attitude one determinately does not bear to a proposition, one 
determinately rejects that one determinately bears this attitude to it. 
These assumptions are slightly different from the original ones, in that any attitude 
ascription is replaced with an explicitly determinate attitude ascription. In certain small 
ways, these assumptions are both weaker and stronger than the original three.12F13 But 
12 However, the diagnosis of confusion in terms of neither accepting nor rejecting may have something 
going for it. When we first come to consider proposition R, we presumably don’t yet have any 
attitudes towards it. In other words, we start out with stance (iii). It’s hard to see how, in the process 
of considering R, we would naturally end up in a state of indeterminate attitudes towards it, instead 
just remaining in the unopinionated state that we started out with. Since all options look equally bad, 
there doesn’t seem to be anything that would motivate us to change our set of attitudes, 
irrationality-inducing as that set may be. 
13 The assumptions are of broadly conditional form, which means that one would strengthen them by 
either weakening the antecedent or strengthening the consequent, and that one would weaken them 
by either strengthening the antecedent or weakening the consequent. Here both the antecedent and 
consequent are strengthened in each case, but in the case of A the antecedent is strengthened in two 
ways and the consequent in one, while in the case of B and C the antecedent is strengthened in one 
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bearing in mind that these assumptions are supposed to hold of ideal cognitive agents 
(of the ‘transparent’ sort) I think they are no less plausible than the original three. 
With these reformulated assumptions in mind, let’s again consider options (i) – (iv), 
imagining in each case that the attitudes in question are borne (or not borne) with 
determinacy. Option (iv), determinately accepting and determinately rejecting R*, is 
still a non-starter. Nothing changes here by the addition of a determinacy operator. 
What about option (i), just determinately accepting R*? Well, given the content of 
R*, this amounts to determinately accepting that one determinately rejects R*. By A* 
this entails that one determinately rejects R*. So one determinately accepts R* and 
determinately rejects it*, same as before. 
What about option (ii), just determinately rejecting R*? Well, by B*, one will then 
determinately accept that one determinately rejects R*. And given the content of R*, 
that entails that one determinately accepts R* itself. And so one determinately accepts 
R* and determinately rejects it, as before. 
What about option (iii), determinately doing neither, i.e. determinately not accepting 
R* and determinately not rejecting it? Well, if one determinately does not reject R*, 
then by C* one determinately rejects that one determinately rejects R*. But given the 
content of R*, that entails rejecting R*. As we can see above, that gets us back into 
trouble. 
That leaves the indeterminist’s preferred option (v): having indeterminate attitudes 
to R*. What happens in that case? Given that the assumptions above explicitly only 
rule on determinate cases, they will not serve to get one into trouble. But now consider 
this further assumption: 
[C**] For any attitude one does not determinately bear to a proposition, 
one determinately rejects that one determinately bears this attitude to 
it. 
This assumption is not to be confused with C* above: the negation and the 
determinacy operator are reversed here in the antecedent. But C** isn’t any more 
objectionable than C*. Consider: if one’s attitudes to a proposition happen to be 
indeterminate, then it will determinately not be the case that one determinately 
rejects the proposition in question. And given that this is determinately not the case, it 
seems entirely appropriate to determinately reject it.13F14 
way and the consequent in two ways. 
14  Someone might object at this point that it might conceivably be indeterminate whether one’s 
attitudes to a proposition are indeterminate, i.e. one’s attitudes might be higher-order-
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With C** at our disposal, the reasoning runs as follows. If one’s attitudes to R* are 
indeterminate, then one does not determinately bear the attitude of rejection to R*. 
By C**, that entails that one determinately rejects that one determinately bears the 
attitude of rejection to R*. Given the content of R*, that amounts to determinately 
rejecting R. And that, as we have seen, gets us into trouble. 
To sum up, while the indeterminist’s option (v) does seem to get us out of the 
original pickle that the Rejecter landed us in, closely analogous reasoning about the 
Determined Rejecter gets us straight back into it. So the indeterminist solution, while 
the most promising of the ones I’ve considered, does not get the job done. 
 
5. Giving up in the face of irrationality 
 
If the indeterminist option is the most promising one, and it doesn’t work, does that 
mean we should simply give up on solving the Rejecter paradox? Yes, I think that is 
exactly what it means. We should take the way of least resistance, and embrace that 
there's no philosophical response to the Rejecter paradox which neutralises it. In other 
words, we should accept that R lands the ideal cognitive agent in rationally 
incompatible attitudes. I do not think that this is merely the act of a desperate 
philosopher, though. I think it’s a perfectly acceptable conclusion to draw that 
irrationality is sometimes unavoidable. 
First, as a general consideration, we might note that it is sometimes worth sacrificing 
a little rationality to save something else of value, such as effort. This is a view one 
could take of cases like the preface paradox, for instance.14F15 Let’s say I’ve written a 
monograph, and while I’ve done so with due diligence, I think that I’ve still probably 
made a mistake somewhere. How can I rationally believe the claims in my book while 
also believing that at least one of them is false? Well, perhaps I can’t. But if the only 
alternative to being irrational in this way is checking and re-checking the whole book 
ad nauseam, I might be better off just living with the irrationality. And if we ought to be 
willing to accept that sometimes irrationality is a lesser evil, is it so much more terrible 
indeterminate. Perhaps, but one would not want to endorse that option in the case of R or R*. For if 
it is indeterminate whether one’s attitudes are determinate, and having determinate attitudes gets 
one into trouble (as we have already seen) then the best result one can hope for with respect to R or 
R* is that it is indeterminate whether they get us into trouble. Now perhaps one might decide to go 
for that result if one were convinced that nothing better could be had, but it clearly falls short of the 
result that the indeterminism about R was supposed to secure for us. 
15 See Makinson (1965). 
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to accept that sometimes it is an unavoidable evil? 15F16 
One might have more specific worries, though. One might worry that, in some way, 
buying into unavoidable rationality gets one into greater trouble down the line. I can 
think of two such worries. 
Ought implies can. Is the idea of unavoidable irrationality inconsistent with the 
principle that ought implies can or (more immediately) its contrapositive, the principle 
that can't implies needn't? This depends on what view one takes of the normativity of 
rationality. Ought we always be rational? If so, then yes, irrationality is always a failure 
to do what we ought, and unavoidable irrationality would constitute a case where can't 
doesn’t bring needn't along. So on that assumption, can't-implies-needn't (and thus 
ought-implies-can) is indeed violated. 
If one wanted to avoid this result, one option is to claim that rationality is only 
defeasibly obligatory – one ought to be rational, but only where one can. In that case, 
the Rejecter would constitute a case in which rationality is not obligatory, because 
rationality is not attainable there. This option might attract those who think the 
notions of normativity and blameworthiness should be quite closely linked. We clearly 
don't always regard irrationality as blameworthy: we all know that we all probably have 
some incoherencies among our beliefs, and yet we're not parcelling out any blame for 
that. If one holds that something not being blameworthy implies that it is permissible, 
then one should think there's lots of permissible irrationality about. 
I do however think that irrationality is always impermissible. I think there is 
something inherently normative about rationality. But I also think that failures to do 
what one ought can be excusable (i.e. blameless), and that this is the case with the 
Rejecter. To accept R and reject it is irrational and hence impermissible, but also 
excusable because unavoidable. This is a violation of ought-implies-can, sure. But I 
don't think we should be scared to give that principle up, once we've distinguished the 
impermissible from the blameworthy. The real intuitive force is with necessity-implies-
blamelessness, not with necessity-implies-permissibility (i.e. can’t-implies-needn’t, i.e. 
ought-implies-can). And necessity-implies-blamelessness is preserved. So this first 
worry doesn’t hold up. 
Rational explosion. Accepting and rejecting the same thing seems somewhat akin to 
16 Perhaps what I describe as sacrificing rationality for something else could, in the case of the preface 
paradox, be described as one kind of rationality (practical rationality) trumping another (theoretical 
rationality). If so, take me to be speaking specifically about theoretical rationality, everywhere above. 
It does not really matter for the case at hand, because with R no such trumping is going on, and no 
other kind of rationality is involved. 
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believing a contradiction. Might it therefore engender something akin to explosion? 
Would having such attitudes to R commit an agent to, say, accepting any proposition 
whatsoever, or rejecting any proposition whatsoever, or perhaps not rejecting any 
proposition whatsoever? It's easiest to construct a putative argument for the last of 
these – that accepting and rejecting the same thing commits the agent to not rejecting 
any proposition. Extra assumptions will then let us turn that into a putative argument 
for universal acceptance, but since universal non-rejection is already bad enough, I 
won’t pursue the stronger result. Also, I should note that other arguments are possible 
besides the one I present; but this one seems most elegant and straightforward, and as 
far as I can see, others will have comparable weaknesses. 
Here goes. Assume the following: 
[D] If A1, A2, …, An ├ B, then one should not accept all of A1, A2, …, An whilst 
rejecting B (for any propositions A1, A2, …, An and B).  
[E] One ought not reject a proposition A without also accepting its 
negation. 
D is, I think, a pretty plausible principle.16F17 E is considerably more contentious. As noted 
in section 1, paracomplete and intuitionist logicians may well hold that some 
propositions (i.e. gappy or unknowable ones) ought to be rejected along with their 
negations. Principle E would then commit them to accepting those propositions and 
their negations, not something they would be happy to do. Classical and paraconsistent 
logicians will not have a similar issue with E – but that is not to say that they have 
positive reasons for accepting it. 
Let's say the agent accepts and rejects R. By E, they ought then accept ¬R. If they do 
that, they accept R and ¬R. By ex contradictione quodlibet, R and ¬R imply a randomly 
picked proposition Q. Given assumption D, they then have two options: they ought 
either not accept both R and ¬R, or not reject Q. However, given the Rejecter paradox, 
they cannot but accept R, and given assumption E they ought to accept ¬R. So the only 
remaining option is to not reject Q. Since Q was randomly chosen, they ought not 
reject any proposition. Therefore, accepting and rejecting P commits them to not 
rejecting anything. 
What are our options for avoiding this calamity? I can see four: 
• Give up ex contradictione quodlibet.  Many philosophers already do give up this 
principle, for varied reasons. I would not be averse to taking this line myself, but 
17  As noted in section 1, it is defended in Restall (2005). 
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it is still generally regarded as radical. 
• Give up assumption D. This assumption, to my mind, is fairly plausible and I 
would be loath to reject it.  
• Give up assumption E. As noted, some logicians can be expected to take issue 
with this principle independently of the issue at hand. It seems to have various 
prima facie counterexamples: truth-value gaps, cases of indeterminacy, cases of 
in-principle ignorance. (These will not necessarily be distinct cases, of course – 
that will depend on one’s views.) Those counterexamples might individually be 
controversial, but in the absence of any strong reason pushing us towards E, they 
should have some force. And these qualms are not exclusive to paracomplete 
and intuitionist logicians: classical logicians who advocate a supervaluationist 
treatment of indeterminacy might well hold that one ought to reject 
indeterminate propositions and their negations, and they would then have the 
same trouble with E as paracomplete and intuitionist logicians do. Paraconsistent 
logicians might have no issue with E, but they would be very likely to have given 
up ex contradictione quodlibet, and so are not in trouble anyway. 
• Find a loophole. In the argument above, assumption E tells the agent to accept 
¬R. If they do so, they land in a normative pickle: they will be obliged not to 
reject any proposition. But of course they might also simply disobey the 
commands of assumption E, and not accept ¬R. Sure, that would be to fail to live 
up to their obligations (assuming E is correct in the first place) but if they did 
accept ¬E they would end up with a great many more obligations that they would 
inevitably fail to live up to (i.e. obligations to not reject anything). So why not 
duck out early? Of course, in the present context that means that the ideal 
cognitive agents we’ve been talking about would be involved in additional 
irrationality over and above violating the Principle of Self-Agreement: they would 
also violate assumption E. 
Of these four options, the third one seems to me the most painless, most conservative, 
and most plausible. But whichever one prefers, it should be clear that ‘rational 
explosion’ is anything but unavoidable. 
There may of course be other problems besides these two that result from 
embracing unavoidable irrationality. And it’s quite imaginable that those will turn out 
to be so severe that buying into unavoidable irrationality simply isn’t an option. But I 
am not aware of any such problems, and in their absence, I think buying into the 
irrationality is our best option. 
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 6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper I’ve presented a paradox and argued that it tells us something interesting 
about ideal – ‘transparent’ – cognitive agents: they either violate the Principle of Self-
Agreement or they fail to be truly ideal in failing to live up to assumptions A, B or C.17F18 
The paradox does not pertain merely to ideal agents, though. Though the assumptions 
A, B and C are not such that ordinary cognitive agents will satisfy them in their full 
generality, it is not so implausible that they will satisfy them to a limited extent (i.e. 
with regard to some propositions, and up to some level of higher-order attitudes). They 
may well satisfy them to the extent of getting into trouble with the Rejecter. 
But though the Rejecter gets one into trouble – in the sense of landing one in 
irrational attitudes and thereby stopping one from living up to one’s cognitive 
obligations – I’ve argued that this is not the end of the world. Just as irrationality can 
sometimes be a lesser evil, it can also be necessary evil. That’s life; and since no further 
trouble seems to result from this evil, we should be able to learn to live with it. 
Apart from what it shows us, the Rejecter is also an interesting paradox in its own 
right. While it bears an obvious similarity to the Liar, it is independent of it – the 
notions of truth and falsehood never once make an appearance. And it is also 
interestingly more tricky than the Liar – neither the closest analogue of a glutty 
response (i.e. accepting and rejecting R) nor the analogue of a gappy response (i.e. not 
accepting or rejecting R) nor more sophisticated versions thereof (i.e. infinite-order 
agnosticism, indeterminism) can get a grip on it.  
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